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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge: 
 
We must decide whether the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 precludes our review of 
Appellant's unsuccessful S 2255 motion to correct his 
sentence, notwithstanding the District Court's issuance of 
a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C.S 2253. 
Appellant contends that the District Court erred by 
sentencing him under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 because the 
Government did not prove the substance involved in his 
criminal offenses was crack cocaine. The court order 
declared: "A certificate of appealability on the crack- 
enhancement is granted. It is denied on all other issues." 
App. at 113a. The Government now moves for dismissal of 
this appeal on the grounds that the District Court 
erroneously issued the certificate of appealability because 
Cepero did not make a "substantial showing of the denial of 
a constitutional right" as required under S 2253(c)(2) so as 
to invoke our limited power to review the denial of his 
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S 2255 petition. We will grant the Government's motion to 
dismiss. 
 
I. 
 
In April 1997, Angel Cepero was indicted along with two 
co-defendants for conspiracy to distribute and possess with 
intent to distribute "cocaine and more than 50 grams of 
cocaine base, a/k/a `crack' cocaine" in violation of 21 
U.S.C. SS 841(a) and 846. The indictment listed the overt 
acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy as the 
delivery and sale of "cocaine base," but did not specifically 
mention "crack cocaine."1 
 
An assistant federal public defender was appointed as 
Cepero's counsel, and in June and July 1997 filed two 
pretrial motions, both of which referred to the substance at 
issue as "crack cocaine." Shortly thereafter, Cepero 
executed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead 
guilty to the conspiracy count, which paragraph 1 identified 
as "conspiracy to distribute more than 5 grams of cocaine 
base." In pertinent part, paragraph 1 stated also that the 
"maximum penalty for the offense is imprisonment for a 
period of 40 years [and] a fine of $2,000,000," which 
corresponds to the maximum penalties for crack cocaine 
under 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Paragraph 9 of the plea 
agreement stipulated that his offense conduct "involved no 
less than 35 but no more than 50 grams of cocaine base." 
Cepero and his public defender reviewed and signed the 
agreement. 
 
Three days later a guilty-plea hearing was held, during 
which the sentencing court, the prosecutor and the public 
defender all referred to the offense as involving either 
cocaine or cocaine base. The prosecutor noted the statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In 1993 the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to 
include the following definition of cocaine base: 
 
       "Cocaine base," for the purposes of this guideline, means "crack." 
       "Crack" is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually 
       prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium 
       bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1. 
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range of penalties as being from five to 40 years and a 
maximum fine of $250,000, based on the agreement that 
Cepero's conduct involved 35 to 50 grams of cocaine base. 
The prosecutor summarized the Government's case and 
consistently referred to the drug transaction as involving 
cocaine or cocaine base. Cepero agreed that this was an 
accurate account of his involvement and pled guilty to the 
conspiracy charge. 
 
The presentence report identified the substance at issue 
as "crack cocaine." The report concluded that Cepero's base 
offense level was 30, derived from U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 for 
offenses involving at least 35 grams but less than 50 grams 
of cocaine base. After a two point deduction for acceptance 
of responsibility, his offense level was 28, and his criminal 
history category was set at III, which resulted in a guideline 
range of 97 to 121 months. Neither the Government nor the 
defendant objected to the report. On November 2, 1997, 
Cepero was sentenced to 97 months imprisonment and he 
did not appeal. 
 
On September 20, 1998, Cepero filed his pro se  habeas 
petition in the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2255 
and alleged inter alia that the Government failed to prove at 
sentencing that the substance in question was crack 
cocaine and not merely cocaine powder, which carries a 
lesser sentence.2 The court denied his petition by 
memorandum order but granted him a certificate of 
appealability under S 2253(c) with respect to the "crack- 
enhancement" issue--i.e., whether the Government 
adequately proved at sentencing that he had conspired to 
distribute crack cocaine. Cepero timely filed his notice of 
appeal and thereafter the Government moved to dismiss for 
want of subject-matter jurisdiction. We appointed counsel 
and referred the matter to a merits panel, to which both 
parties submitted briefs and argued their positions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines directs a sentencing court 
to use the same base offense level for a crime involving 1.5 kilograms or 
more of cocaine base, or crack cocaine, that it would use for a crime 
involving 150 kilograms or more of powdered cocaine. Thus, an 
enhanced sentence exists in crimes involving crack cocaine vis-a-vis 
powdered cocaine. 
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After argument, we granted re-hearing en banc  to decide 
whether the District Court erroneously granted Cepero a 
certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c), as 
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's legal 
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to the 
court's factual findings. Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 262 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 
II. 
 
Before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a petitioner in federal 
custody who was denied relief by a district court on a 
S 2255 petition could appeal to the court of appeals without 
obtaining a certificate of probable cause. See  28 U.S.C. 
S 2253 (1995) (pre-AEDPA language); United States v. Eyer, 
113 F.3d 470, 472 (3d Cir. 1997). By contrast, a petitioner 
in state custody challenging his detention could not appeal 
the denial of his petition "unless the justice or judge who 
rendered the order or a circuit justice or judge issue[d] a 
certificate of probable cause." 28 U.S.C. S 2253 (1995) (pre- 
AEDPA language); see Eyer, 113 F.3d at 472. 
 
Section 102 of the Antiterrorist and Effective Death 
Penalty Act amended the jurisdictional dimension ofS 2253 
to provide: 
 
       (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
       certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken 
       to the court of appeals from-- 
 
       (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
       which the detention complained of arises out of 
       process issued by a State court; or 
 
       (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 
       2255. 
 
       (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 
       paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
       substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
       right. 
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       (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) 
       shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the 
       showing required by paragraph (2). 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)-(3) (as amended Apr. 24, 1996) 
(emphasis added). The AEDPA thus replaced certificates of 
probable cause with "certificates of appealability" and 
required prisoners in federal custody to obtain certificates 
of appealability before appealing from the denial of their 
S 2255 petitions. 
 
In our prior decisions interpreting the amended version of 
S 2253, we have held that, notwithstanding the ambiguous 
language of the statute which seems to empower only 
circuit court judges with the authority to grant certificates 
of appealability, see S 2253(c)(1), the district court judge 
who denies the prisoner's habeas petition is also authorized 
to certify issues for appeal. See Eyer, 113 F.3d at 472-473; 
accord Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1016 (2d 
Cir. 1997) ("We therefore uphold the authority of district 
judges to issue [certificates of appealability], at least in 
section 2254 cases."); United States v. Asrar , 108 F.3d 217, 
218 (9th Cir. 1997); Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 
F.3d 1063, 1066-1073 (6th Cir. 1997); Hunter v. United 
States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1573-1577 (11th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). 
 
III. 
 
We recognize that several courts of appeals have passed 
on the question we decide today--whether we have 
jurisdiction under S 2253(c) to review the denial of a S 2255 
petition where the Government challenges the validity of a 
certificate of appealability issued by a district court. In 
United States v. Eyer, we assumed jurisdiction to review the 
denial of a S 2255 petition notwithstanding the questioned 
validity of the certificate of appealability, but in that case 
the Government opposed only the power of the district 
court to issue certificates of appealability and took the 
position that, if the district court was authorized to certify 
issues for appeal under S 2253(c), then the case should be 
decided on the merits. We concluded that district court 
judges were authorized to issue certificates of appealability 
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and thereafter assumed jurisdiction. Nevertheless we 
recognized the lingering question of whether the petitioner 
made a "substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right." 
 
       [Petitioner] raises questions . . . involving issues of 
       statutory construction. Therefore, it is possible that 
       [he] does not raise an issue involving a constitutional 
       right. 
 
        Here [ ] we avoid the procedural point because the 
       government . . . . took the position that if the district 
       court is empowered to issue certificates of appealability 
       under section 2253(c)(1), we should decide this case on 
       the merits. Thus, the determination of the meaning of 
       "constitutional right" in section 2253(c)(2) is not 
       necessary to the disposition of this appeal. 
 
        In reaching our result, we have not disregarded our 
       practice of examining our jurisdiction before reaching 
       the merits of an appeal, and we recognize the 
       possibility that the procedural problems we have 
       identified [i.e., petitioner's possible failure to raise 
       issues implicating constitutional rights] could be 
       considered jurisdictional. Instead, we are applying the 
       settled principle that an appellate court, confronted by 
       a difficult jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional 
       question, may forego its resolution if the merits of the 
       appeal are, as here, straightforward and easily resolved 
       in favor of the party or parties to whose benefit the 
       objection to jurisdiction would redound. 
 
Eyer, 113 F.3d at 474 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). This practice of exercising"hypothetical 
jurisdiction" is neither new nor specific to certificates of 
appealability. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better 
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998) (collecting cases). 
Nevertheless, in 1998 the Supreme Court largely rejected 
this custom. See id. at 94. We recently discussed the 
Court's teachings in Steel Co. vis-a-vis our past exercise of 
hypothetical jurisdiction in Eyer: 
 
       We recognize that the Supreme Court in Steel Co.  [ ] 
       disapproved the practice of a court of appeals, such as 
       in Eyer [ ], avoiding difficult jurisdictional questions 
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       when a merits determination would favor the party who 
       would benefit if it declined to exercise jurisdiction. But 
       if we were to determine that we will not issue a 
       certificate of appealability because [petitioner] has not 
       demonstrated that he is entitled to one under 28 
       U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3), then we would find that this court 
       does not have jurisdiction to go forward in this appeal. 
 
United States v. Williams, 158 F.3d 736, 741-742 (3d Cir. 
1998). We continue to recognize that the Court's opinion in 
Steel Co. stands for the proposition that an Article III court 
may not assume subject-matter jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of an appeal. 
 
Several of our sister courts of appeals have reached the 
merits of prisoners' appeals from unsuccessful S 2255 
petitions based on the reasoning that S 2253(c)(2) is not 
jurisdictional in nature. In Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 
794, 799 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 928 (1998), 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an 
erroneously issued certificate of appealability satisfied the 
requirements of S 2253(c)(2) regardless of whether it was 
properly issued, reasoning as follows: 
 
       The certificate is a screening device, helping to 
       conserve judicial (and prosecutorial) resources. . . Once 
       a certificate has issued, however, the case proceeds to 
       briefing and decision; the resources have been 
       invested. It is too late to narrow the issues or screen 
       out weak claims. Perhaps a motion to dismiss an 
       appeal on the ground that a certificate was improperly 
       issued would serve some function. But once the briefs 
       have been written and the case heard, there is little 
       point in scrutinizing the certificate of appealability. An 
       obligation to determine whether a certificate should 
       have been issued, even if the parties do not present 
       this issue for decision--a step entailed by the 
       conclusion that a proper certificate is a jurisdictional 
       requirement--would increase the complexity of appeals 
       in collateral attacks and the judicial effort required to 
       resolve them, the opposite of the legislative plan. So we 
       proceed to the merits as the parties have presented 
       them. 
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Id. at 799. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the 
same conclusion and relied on the Young reasoning. See 
United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1164 (1999). Similarly, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted this 
reasoning in Soto v. United States, 185 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 
1999), emphasizing that "the certificate is a screening 
device" and that it had previously intimated the same "gate- 
keeping" view of the certificate of appealability requirement 
in Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir. 
1997). It reasoned that "dismissing an appeal after a 
certificate of appealability has already issued would be of 
little utility; installing this Court as a gate keeper for the 
gate keeper would be redundant." Soto, 185 F.3d at 52. 
 
IV. 
 
The difficulty that we have with the approach of our 
sister courts of appeals is that they fail to recognize the 
precise jurisprudential nature of a certificate of 
appealability as defined in Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 
236 (1998). The centerpiece of the reasoning of those courts 
is that a certificate is an administrative function, described 
as "a screening device, helping to conserve judicial (and 
prosecutorial) resources." Young, 124 F.3d at 799; see Talk, 
158 F.3d at 1065, 1068; Soto, 185 F.3d at 52.3 
 
The question for decision in Hohn was "whether the 
Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of 
appeals denying applications for certificate of appealability," 
524 U.S. at 238-239. To reach this question the Court first 
had to decide whether the issuance of a certificate of 
appealability by a court of appeals constituted a judicial 
function, rather than an administrative function, and was 
therefore subject to judicial review. The Court rejected the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Young in 
August of 1997, it did not have the advantage of the Supreme Court's 
June 15, 1998 decision in Hohn. However, the Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Tenth Circuits decided Soto (July 21, 1999) and Talk (Sept. 
11, 1998), respectively, after Hohn was handed down. 
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notion advanced by the respondent in the case before it, 
and explicit in the reasoning in Young, Talk and Soto, that 
a certificate of appealability is merely a screening device. To 
the contrary, the Court held that decisions regarding 
applications for certificates of appealability are not merely 
an administrative function of the courts. Hohn , 524 U.S. at 
245. The teaching of Hohn is clear and unambiguous: 
 
       Decisions regarding applications for certificates of 
       appealability, in contrast, are judicial in nature.  It is 
       typical for both parties to enter appearances and to 
       submit briefs at appropriate times and for the court of 
       appeals to enter a judgment and to issue a mandate at 
       the end of the proceedings, as happened here. . . . 
       Construing the issuance of a certificate of appealability 
       as an administrative function, moreover, would suggest 
       an entity not wielding judicial power might review the 
       decisions of an Article III court. In light of the 
       constitutional questions which surround such an 
       arrangement, see Gordon [v. United States, 117 U.S. 
       Appx. 697, 702, 704 (1864)]; Hayburn's Case , 2 Dall. 
       409 (1792), we should avoid any such implication. 
 
Hohn, 524 U.S. at 245-246 (emphasis added). The Court 
then proceeded to analogize Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
(1942): 
 
       We held the request for leave [to appeal] constituted a 
       case in the district court over which the court of 
       appeals could assert jurisdiction, even though the 
       district court had denied the request. We reasoned, 
       "[p]resentation of the petition for judicial action is the 
       institution of a suit. Hence the denial of the district 
       court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was 
       the judicial determination of a case or controversy, 
       reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals." 317 
       U.S., at 24. 
 
Hohn, 524 U.S. at 246. The Court concluded by stating, 
 
       the circumstance that the question before the court is 
       a preliminary issue, such as the denial of a certificate 
       of appealability or venue, does not oust appellate 
       courts of the jurisdiction to review a ruling on the 
       matter. 
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Id. at 248. 
 
In view of the explicit language of the Court, we must 
reject the analysis of our sister circuits and decline the 
notion that this court is bound by the District Court's 
issuance of a certificate of appealability. The issuance of 
the certificate in the case before us is not merely an 
exercise of judicial gate-keeping, but rather, in the language 
of the Court, is "the judicial determination of a case or 
controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals." 
Hohn, 524 U.S. at 246 (quoting Quirin , 317 U.S. at 24). We 
now proceed into a review of the order granting the 
certificate of appealability. 
 
V. 
 
Our first task in our review is to address Section 102 of 
the Antiterrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 
which amended the jurisdictional dimension of S 2253: 
 
       (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
       certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken 
       to the court of appeals from-- 
 
       (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
       which the detention complained of arises out of 
       process issued by a State court; or 
 
       (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 
       2255. 
 
       (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 
       paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
       substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
       right. 
 
       (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) 
       shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the 
       showing required by paragraph (2). 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). It had been 
suggested that the use by Congress of the phrase 
"substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right" 
was inadvertent, inasmuch as it intended to codify the 
teachings of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), a 
S 2254 case in which the Court used the expression 
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"substantial showing of the denial of a federal right." 463 
U.S. at 893 (emphasis added). The denial of a federal right 
encompasses not only rights assured by the United States 
Constitution but also those based on federal statutes, 
including the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
Cepero advances two basic arguments, either of which he 
claims requires us to reject the plain language of 
"constitutional right" and hold that Congress intended the 
phrase to mean "federal right"--first, that the amended 
version of S 2253(c) does not mean what it says, because 
Congress in the AEDPA intended to codify the Court's 
holding in Barefoot, which used the expression "federal 
right," but mistakenly amended the statute to apply to only 
those issues implicating the denial of a "constitutional 
right"; second, that in Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 
(1999), the Court considered the merits of a S 2255 appeal 
that did not implicate a constitutional right. 
 
A. 
 
We are satisfied that the Court has recently made clear 
that the use of the phrase "constitutional right" must be 
given effect. "Our task is to interpret the statute as best we 
can, not to second-guess the wisdom of the congressional 
policy choice . . . . Congress chose the language that 
requires us to decide as we do, and Congress is free to 
change it." Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989) 
(citation omitted). In Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. 
Ct. 1595 (2000), the Court held: 
 
       When the district court denies a habeas petition on 
       procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's 
       underlying constitutional claim, a COA [certificate of 
       appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at 
       least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable 
       whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial 
       of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would 
       find it debatable whether the district court was correct 
       in its procedural ruling. 
 
Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1604 (emphasis added). In so holding, 
the Court construed S 2253(c) as follows: 
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       Under AEDPA, a COA may not issue unless "the 
       applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial 
       of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c). Except 
       for substituting the word "constitutional" for the word 
       "federal," S 2253 is a codification of the CPC [certificate 
       of probable cause] standard announced in Barefoot v. 
       Estelle. Congress had before it the meaning Barefoot 
       had given to the words it selected; and we give the 
       language found in S 2253(c) the meaning ascribed it in 
       Barefoot, with due note for the substitution of the word 
       "constitutional." 
 
Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1603 (emphasis added and citations 
omitted). 
 
Prior to the Court's opinion in Slack, the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit offered a similar analysis of the post- 
AEDPA version of S 2253(c): 
 
       By requiring an applicant for a certificate of probable 
       cause to make a "substantial showing of the denial of 
       a federal right," the Supreme Court in Barefoot ensured 
       that appellate review of the federal habeas process 
       should be limited to petitions that make a colorable 
       showing of constitutional error. Although the Court 
       used the word "federal," an applicant seeking a 
       certificate of probable cause to appeal a district court's 
       denial of a S 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
       must demonstrate a substantial showing of 
       constitutional error underlying the state conviction. We 
       have always read the Barefoot standard to require a 
       habeas petitioner to make a substantial showing of the 
       denial of a federal constitutional right. Indeed, in the 
       context of federal habeas review of a conviction entered 
       in state court, it is the only intelligible reading. 
 
Lennox v. Evans, 87 F.3d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 
Because Congress' meaning of "constitutional" in 
S 2253(c)(2), as amended, is crucial to our analysis of our 
jurisdiction, it is helpful to examine the legislative history. 
The first legislative report on this bill, House Bill 665, was 
introduced by the House Judiciary Committee on February 
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2, 1995. At that time the bill contained no language 
amending the review provisions of S 2253. The second 
legislative report on the bill was filed four days later, on 
February 6, and again did not purport to amend S 2253. On 
February 8, 1995, the House Judiciary Committee 
introduced House Report 104-23, which accompanied 
House Bill 728. The House Report on this bill contained the 
following language: 
 
        Section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, is 
       amended to read as follows: 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (c) . . . . A certificate of probable cause may only issue 
       if the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the 
       denial of a Federal right. . . . 
 
Sec. 102, H.R. Report No. 104-23 (1995) (emphasis added). 
This Report included also a section entitled "Background 
and Need for the Legislation," which provided: 
 
       The bill also strengthens the certificate of probable 
       cause requirement by providing (in proposed S 2253(c)) 
       that a certificate may issue only on a substantial 
       showing of the denial of a federal right. The bill thus 
       enacts the standard of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 
       (1983). . . . 
 
H.R. Report No. 104-23 ("Background and Need for the 
Legislation"). In March 1995, the Senate and House of 
Representatives considered various versions of the bill, and 
on December 5 and 6 the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees respectively issued their final reports on the 
proposed legislation, neither of which contained language 
amending S 2253. 
 
On April 15, 1996, House Conference Report No. 104- 
518, accompanied by S. 735, was passed. Both the 
Conference Report and the accompanying bill contained 
language amending S 2253(c). The new bill substituted 
"certificates of appealability" for certificates of probable 
cause, and limited issuance of these certificates to 
situations where petitioners have made a "substantial 
showing of a denial of a constitutional right." (emphasis 
added). Neither the Conference Report nor the 
 
                                14 
  
accompanying bill explained why the language ofS 2253(c) 
referred to "constitutional" and not "federal" rights. 
Congress passed this version of the bill, known as the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), which the 
President signed into law on April 24, 1996. 
 
B. 
 
Notwithstanding AEDPA's limited legislative history on 
this point, it is clear that Congress by amendingS 2253 
intended to codify in part the Court's holding in Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); see H.R. Report No. 104-23 
("Background and Need for the Legislation"). In Barefoot, 
the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in refusing to stay a 
state petitioner's death sentence under a S 2254 
proceeding. Id. at 888. Reviewing the procedural actions of 
the court of appeals, the Court outlined the grounds for 
appealing the denial of a S 2254 petition: 
 
        First. Congress established the requirement that a 
       prisoner obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal 
       in order to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the 
       States' ability to impose sentences, including death 
       sentences. The primary means of separating 
       meritorious from frivolous appeals should be the 
       decision to grant or withhold a certificate of probable 
       cause. . . . We agree with the weight of opinion in the 
       Courts of Appeals that a certificate of probable cause 
       requires petitioner to make a "substantial showing of 
       the denial of [a] federal right." Stewart v. Beto, 454 
       F.2d 268, 270, n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied , 406 
       U.S. 925 (1972). 
 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted) (citing Ramsey v. Hand, 309 F.2d 947, 948 (10th 
Cir. 1962); and Goode v. Wainright, 670 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 
1982)). 
 
There is no doubt that the current version of S 2253(c)(2) 
codified the Court's holding in Barefoot that a petitioner 
must make a "substantial showing." Congress, however, 
made a significant change to the Barefoot standard, 
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"substituting the word `constitutional' for the word 
`federal.' " Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1603. The term 
"constitutional right" means something very different from 
the term "federal right," and because we must assume that 
Congress "means in a statute what it says," Connecticut 
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992), we give 
effect to the change. 
 
It must be emphasized that it makes no difference 
whether "the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
which the detention complained of arises out of process 
issued by a State court" described in S 2253(c)(1)(A) 
emanates from a proceeding brought under S 2254 or 
S 2241(c)(3) (a prisoner in custody "in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"). 
Under either proceeding, a state prisoner must obtain a 
certificate of appealability--that is, "make a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right" under 
S 2253(c)(2)--before appealing from any aspect of the state- 
ordered detention under S 2253(c)(1)(A). See Montez v. 
McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 869 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]his court 
reads S 2253(c)(1)(A) as applying whenever a state prisoner 
habeas petition relates to matters flowing from a state court 
detention order[, including challenges underS 2254 and 
S 2241.]"). Federal prisoner appeals fromS 2241 
proceedings, however, are not governed by 2253's certificate 
of appealability requirement. See 28 U.S.C.S 2253(c)(1)(B) 
(applying the certificate of appealability requirement to 
federal prisoner appeals from "the final order in a 
proceeding under section 2255"); see also Sugarman v. 
Pitzer, 170 F.3d 1145, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("We hold that 
a COA is not required for federal prisoner S 2241 appeals."); 
Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 681 (5th Cir. 1997). 4 
 
This is not to suggest that Congress' amendment of 
S 2253(c)(2) was without problems. We confront the specter 
that Congress has now differentiated between the type of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It bears emphasis that S 2241 is not involved in this case because 
Appellant brought this action as a "Motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 to 
Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a person in Federal Custody." 
App. at 65a. He did not argue otherwise in the district court or in his 
briefs to this court. See Appellant's Br. at iv, Table of Authorities. 
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S 2255 petition that may be filed in district court and the 
type that may be appealed to this court. Cf. United States 
v. Gordon, 172 F.3d 753, 754 (10th Cir. 1999); Young, 124 
F.3d at 799. Section 2255 petitioners may allege and have 
adjudicated non-constitutional issues in district court: 
 
       A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 
       established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be 
       released upon the ground that the sentence was 
       imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws  of the 
       United States, or that the court was without 
       jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the 
       sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by 
       law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may 
       move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, 
       set aside or correct the sentence. . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2255 (emphasis added); see Gordon, 172 F.3d 
at 754. However, the courts of appeals under the post- 
AEDPA version of S 2253(c)(2) have limited jurisdiction over 
unsuccessful S 2255 petitions. Hohn, 524 U.S. at 240; see 
Young, 124 F.3d at 799 ("If the district court denies a 
[S 2255] petition based on a statutory issue, S 2253(c)(2) 
precludes an appeal."). To the ad terrorem  argument that 
the defendant is thereby totally denied the opportunity to 
appeal nonconstitutional issues, the short answer is that 
Congress has indicated that these issues must be 
presented in the direct appeal from the conviction. 
 
C. 
 
We now address the argument that the Court sub silentio 
has already interpreted S 2253(c)(1)-(3) and has held that 
the phrase "denial of a constitutional right" may be 
interpreted to embrace non-constitutional issues such as 
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999). 
 
Although there is no discussion or reference made in the 
Peguero opinion that contemplates the precise issue 
presented here, Appellant here argues that the issue of 
jurisdiction under S 2253(c) was before the Peguero Court 
because the Government indirectly raised the issue in a 
footnote in its brief, when it stated: 
 
                                17 
  
        The government acquiesced in the granting of a 
       certificate of appealability. [ ] In fact, however, the 
       district court erred in issuing a certificate. A certificate 
       of appealability may be issued "only if the applicant 
       has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 
       constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. (c)(2) (Suppl. II 1996), 
       and the Rule 32 error on which the petitioner sought 
       the certificate is not of constitutional dimension. 
 
Brief for Respondent at *6 n.5, Peguero, 1998 WL 848085. 
 
There are two answers to this contention. First, the 
footnote clearly states that the "government acquiesced in 
the granting of the certificate." Having acquiesced in the 
granting of the certificate in the court below, it may not be 
contended that the Government was raising a serious 
jurisdictional argument before the Supreme Court. Second, 
and much more fundamental, the Court consistently 
teaches that an opinion that does not refer to or 
substantially treat the jurisdictional argument does not 
have the strong bite of binding precedent. See e.g., 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
119 (1984). 
 
We are of the view that the teachings of Peguero  do not 
address the precise issues presented in this case. There the 
Court did not have before it the issue of whether a 
certificate of appealability could issue for other than a claim 
of constitutional right. Specifically, the first sentence of the 
Court's opinion stated the question for decision: 
 
       We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict over 
       whether a district court's failure to advise a defendant 
       of his right to appeal as required by the Federal Rules 
       of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for collateral 
       relief even when the defendant was aware of his right 
       to appeal when the trial court omitted to give the 
       advice. 
 
Peguero, 526 U.S. at 963. That was the only issue before 
the court and the teachings of that case must be limited to 
the precise issue decided. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction 
have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this 
Court has never considered itself bound when a 
subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue 
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before us." Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 119 (quoting Hagans v. 
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)); see United States v. 
More, 7 U.S. 159, 172 (1805) ("No question was made, in 
that case, as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and 
the court does not consider itself as bound by that case.") 
(Marshall, C.J.). 
 
In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court 
referred to a series of cases in which it reached the merits 
of challenges to federal welfare regulations brought by 
welfare recipients. In meeting for the first time whether the 
Eleventh Amendment precluded federal court jurisdiction to 
grant retroactive relief, the Court noted that it had 
previously decided the cases on the merits without meeting 
the question of jurisdiction. It referred also to Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where "the Eleventh 
Amendment objection to such retroactive relief was actually 
presented to this Court in a case which was orally argued." 
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 670. Significantly, the Court 
explained why Shapiro and three other cases decided by the 
Court on the merits could not be interpreted as sub silentio 
deciding the issue of jurisdiction: 
 
       This Court, while affirming the judgment [in Shapiro], 
       did not in its opinion refer to or substantially treat the 
       Eleventh Amendment argument. Nor, of course, did the 
       summary dispositions of the three District Court cases 
       contain any substantive discussion of this or any other 
       issues raised by the parties. 
 
        This case, therefore, is the first opportunity the 
       Court has taken to fully explore and treat the Eleventh 
       Amendment aspects of such relief in a written opinion. 
       . . . Having now had the opportunity to more fully 
       consider the Eleventh Amendment holdings of those 
       cases after briefing and argument, we disapprove the 
       Eleventh Amendment holdings of those cases to the 
       extent that they are inconsistent with our holding 
       today. 
 
Id. at 670-671. 
 
The Court had a similar issue before it in Hagans v. 
Lavine, and noted: 
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       In none of these cases was the jurisdiction issue 
       squarely raised as a contention in the petitions for 
       certiorari, jurisdictional statements, or briefsfiled in 
       this Court. Moreover, when questions of jurisdiction 
       have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, 
       this Court has never considered itself bound when a 
       subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue 
       before us. . . . We therefore approach the question of 
       the District Court's jurisdiction to entertain this suit as 
       an open one calling for a canvass of relevant 
       jurisdictional considerations. 
 
Hagans, 415 U.S. at 535 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 
Applying the foregoing teachings to the issue at bar, we 
see that a year after the Peguero decision, in Slack v. 
McDaniel, speaking through Justice Kennedy, the same 
justice who authored the opinion in Peguero, the Court met 
the precise issue presented here: 
 
       Where a district court has rejected the constitutional 
       claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy 
       S 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must 
       demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find that the 
       district court's assessment of the constitutional claims 
       debatable or wrong . . . . This construction gives 
       meaning to Congress' requirement that a prisoner 
       demonstrate substantial underlying constitutional 
       claims . . . . 
 
120 S. Ct. at 1604. 
 
What the Supreme Court did not say in the 1999 Peguero 
case cannot trump what the court explicitly said in Slack a 
year later, especially when both opinions were authored by 
the same justice. Accordingly, we reject the argument that 
the Court's decision in Peguero runs counter to the holding 
we reach today--that a certificate of appealability in a case 
brought under S 2253(c)(2) may issue, in the literal 
language of the statute, "only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
 
VI. 
 
In determining whether the certificate of appealability 
was proper and thus whether we have jurisdiction to review 
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this petition, we examine whether Cepero had made (1) a 
substantial showing of a deprivation of (2) a constitutional 
right, so as to invoke our S 2253(c) jurisdiction. Petitioner 
alleges the District Court erred by enhancing his sentence, 
because the Government failed at sentencing to show 
beyond a preponderance of the evidence that he conspired 
to sell crack cocaine, and not some other form of cocaine 
base. His contention of error thus is misapplication of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and he relies on our decision in 
United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1996) to 
support his claim. 
 
Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a 
much greater sentence for drug offenses involving crack 
cocaine (100 to 1, based on drug amount) than for offenses 
involving powder cocaine or some other form of cocaine 
base. In James, we held that the Government was required 
to prove at sentencing that the defendant distributed crack 
cocaine, not just cocaine base, before S 2D1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines could be used to impose the 
increased sentence. 78 F.3d at 856. However, the facts and 
procedural posture in James are materially different than 
those in Cepero's S 2255 petition. The petitioner in James 
pursued review of his sentence on direct appeal. In 
contrast, Cepero sought post-conviction review of his 
sentence via a S 2255 petition. Section 2255 petitions are 
not substitutes for direct appeals and serve only to protect 
a defendant from a violation of the constitution or from a 
statutory defect so fundamental that a complete 
miscarriage of justice has occurred. Reed v. Farley, 512 
U.S. 339, 348 (1994); Young, 124 F.3d at 796. Under 
S 2253(c)(2), we have appellate jurisdiction over only those 
issues substantially shown to deny a petitioner a 
constitutional right. We find no such deprivation here. 
 
Cepero's allegation here, that the sentencing court 
misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines in his case, is a 
question that does not present a constitutional issue under 
S 2253(c).5 See Buggs v. United States, 153 F.3d 439, 443 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because application of the Sentencing Guidelines in this case does not 
implicate a fact that would increase the penalty of a crime beyond the 
statutory maximum, the teachings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, ___ U.S. 
__, 2000 WL 807189 (June 26, 2000), are not relevant here. 
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(7th Cir. 1998) ("[E]rrors in the implementation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines are generally not cognizable in a 
collateral attack."). Because of the specific misapplication of 
the Sentencing Guidelines that Appellant alleges in this case,6 
we conclude that he has not "made a substantial showing 
of the denial of a constitutional right," and thus the District 
Court erred under S 2253(c)(2) by issuing a certificate of 
appealability. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to 
review the merits of Appellant's case. 
 
*  *  * 
 
       We will grant the Government's motion to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We do not suggest that a misapplication of the Guidelines can never 
rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: 
 
Today we decide that the issuance of a certificate of 
appealability by a District Court is not sufficient to permit 
our review of the merits, but, rather, that we are obliged to 
consider whether the appellant was entitled to a certificate 
of appealability based on our view that we only have 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the 
certificate of appealability was properly issued. We reach 
this conclusion without reference either to the statutory 
language or to Congress's intent, the two factors which 
have traditionally been the hallmarks of our jurisprudence 
when interpreting whether prerequisites for suit or appeal 
are subject matter jurisdictional in nature. See , e.g., Zipes 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) 
(concluding that "[t]he structure of Title VII, the 
congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our 
cases all lead to" the conclusion that "filing a timely charge 
of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to suit in federal court"); Shendock v. Director, 
893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding the 
60 day filing requirement contained in 33 U.S.C.S 921(c) 
for appeals of the decisions of the Benefits Review Board to 
be jurisdictional, in part because the statute uses that 
term) ("We also recognize that a priori attachment of the 
label `jurisdiction' to a statute's filing requirements without 
examination of its language and structure, as well as the 
congressional policy underlying it, would be an abdication 
of our duty to interpret the language of a statute in 
accordance with Congress's intent in passing it."). In so 
doing, we also reject the considered treatment of this issue 
by our fellow courts of appeals, which have found an 
improvidently granted certificate sufficient to permit 
appellate review, because we find their reasoning contrary 
to language contained in Hohn v. United States , 524 U.S. 
236 (1998). See Soto v. United States, 185 F.3d 48, 52 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (finding that even the improvident issuance of a 
certificate of appealability confers appellate jurisdiction); 
United States v. Talk, 158 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that "an erroneously-issued certificate does not 
deprive [the court] of jurisdiction to hear a certified 
appeal"); Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 799 (7th 
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Cir. 1997). However, as I discuss below, the Supreme Court 
in Hohn addressed an issue quite different from the one 
before us. Therefore, I dissent from this portion of the 
majority's opinion. Given the majority's view on this issue, 
however, I concur in the next step it takes, namely its 
determination that the test for the issuance of a certificate 
of appealability requires that the petitioner make a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional, rather 
than a federal, right. 
 
I submit that neither the statutory language ofS 2253(c) 
nor the habeas statute in its entirety can support the 
conclusion the majority reaches on the threshold issue. 
Section 2253(c)(1) simply states that: "Unless a circuit 
justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 
appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from -- . . . 
(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255." 28 
U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1) & (c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Section 
2253(c)(2) explains: "A certificate of appealability may issue 
under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
Id. S 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, in line with the 
plain language, Cepero is entitled to a review of his case 
because a certificate of appealability was issued. Nothing in 
the statutory language suggests, let alone requires, 
otherwise. Certainly, no portion of the language suggests 
that satisfaction of the underlying certificate of 
appealability standard is the trigger to our jurisdiction. 
Rather, by stating that an appeal may not be taken unless 
a certificate of appealability is issued, the statute explains 
that it is simply the issuance of the certificate which 
provides the ticket to appellate review. Congress's limitation 
of the grounds for issuance should not render the 
certificate a nullity if improperly issued, absent a statement 
to that effect. 
 
This reading is buttressed by the fact that S 2253(c)(2) 
also requires that there be a "substantial showing" of a 
denial of a constitutional right. If satisfaction of the one 
term is required for jurisdiction, surely satisfaction of the 
other, nestled right next to the first, is required as well. If 
the majority's reading is correct, it would appear that a 
court of appeals has a duty, under Steel Company v. 
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Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998), to 
determine the "substantiality" of the showing of the 
deprivation in order to determine whether or not it has 
jurisdiction. "Substantiality" is not a quality that yields itself 
easily to analysis, to say the least, and it would be an odd 
statute which turned the existence of judicial power to hear 
an appeal on whether or not such an elusive quality were 
deemed existent. The easier reading, I submit, is that an 
issuing court should attempt to meet this standard, but if 
it missteps, it does not deprive the appeals court of power 
to review. 
 
Furthermore, if S 2253(c)(2) is jurisdictional, why not 
(c)(3)? Subsection (c)(3), like (c)(2), lays out mandatory 
requirements for the issuing court to follow. The certificate 
of appealability must "indicate which specific issue or 
issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2)." But 
what if the certificate of appealability is wanting in this 
regard? In such a situation, remand for clarification might 
be appropriate, but it would be odd indeed if a court of 
appeals were required to dismiss an appeal underS 2253 
for want of jurisdiction because the certificate of 
appealability did not "indicate which specific issues satisfy 
the showing." Yet this is the logical extension of the 
majority's interpretation. 
 
It should be noted that two other provisions ofS 2253 
describe and proscribe our jurisdiction, demonstrating that 
Congress knew how to limit appellate jurisdiction if it 
wanted to do so. Following the general grant of jurisdiction 
over habeas appeals in S 2253(a) (providing that "the final 
order shall be subject to review"), S 2253(b) then limits that 
jurisdiction in a particular case, and does so in clear 
language: "There shall be no right of appeal  from a final 
order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to 
remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 
a person charged with a criminal offense against the United 
States, or to test the validity of such person's detention 
pending removal proceedings." 28 U.S.C. S 2253(b) 
(emphasis added); see also Roba v. United States , 604 F.2d 
215, 218 (2d Cir. 1979) (interpreting this language also 
contained in the previous version of S 2253 to be a 
limitation of appellate jurisdiction). I believe that there is a 
 
                                25 
  
clear difference between the language that there is"no right 
of appeal," and a provision that the issuance of a certificate 
of appealability is a condition to the taking of an appeal. 
 
The lack of support for the conclusion that only the 
proper issuance of a certificate of appealability confers 
subject matter jurisdiction is particularly significant 
because, as the majority reasons and explains, Congress 
developed the certificate of appealability requirements from 
the preexisting certificate of probable cause mechanism. In 
a series of Supreme Court opinions addressing the contours 
of appellate review of the denial of habeas relief in S 2254 
proceedings, the Supreme Court repeatedly explained that 
once a district court has granted a certificate of probable 
cause, the court of appeals must address the merits of the 
petitioner's appeal. See Nowakowski v. Maroney , 386 U.S. 
542, 543 (1967) ("But when a district judge grants such a 
certificate, the court of appeals must grant an appeal in 
forma pauperis (assuming the requisite showing of poverty), 
and proceed to a disposition of the appeal in accord with its 
ordinary procedure."); see also Garrison v. Patterson, 391 
U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (following Nowakowski); Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 242 (1968) (following Nowakowski). 
 
The Supreme Court most recently explained the impact of 
the issuance of a certificate of probable cause in Barefoot v. 
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983), which, of course, forms 
the basis for much of the debate over the meaning of the 
standard for the issuance of a certificate of appealability 
contained in the majority's opinion. In Barefoot , however, 
the Court also explained that: "When a certificate of 
probable cause is issued by the district court, as it was in 
this case, or later by the court of appeals, petitioner must 
then be afforded an opportunity to address the merits, and 
the court of appeals is obligated to decide the merits of the 
appeal." Id. at 893 (emphasis added). Previously, in 
Carafas, the Court explained that review on the merits was 
necessary because "[a]nything less than this, as we held in 
Nowakowski, would negate the office of the certificate of 
probable cause." Carafas, 391 U.S. at 242. The Supreme 
Court noted that this did not, however, prevent an appellate 
court from affirming the district court's decision on the 
merits in a summary, abbreviated fashion upon afinding 
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that the claim was frivolous or otherwise foreclosed. See 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 894. 
 
In imposing the certificate of appealability requirement on 
habeas petitions in both state and federal cases, Congress 
specifically addressed two parts of the old certificate of 
probable cause mechanism. As we decide in this case, 
Congress strengthened the standard for the issuance of a 
certificate announced in Barefoot. Congress also addressed 
the question of whether a court may issue a certificate 
limited to particular issues, see 28 U.S.C.S 2253(c)(3), a 
question that was unclear during the certificate of probable 
cause era, see Sherman v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 138-39 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (describing a circuit split over whether a "limited" 
certificate of probable cause binds the reviewing court to 
consideration of those issues alone). Given that Congress 
clearly addressed those issues, and given the clear 
discussion of the impact of a certificate of probable cause 
in Barefoot, I submit that if Congress had intended to make 
the propriety of the issuance of a certificate of appealability 
jurisdictional in the manner conceived of by the majority, or 
had desired more generally that we review the decision to 
issue a certificate,1 Congress would have phrased the 
statute in manner that makes clear this additional change 
from prior practice. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority does not address whether the order issuing a certificate 
of appealability might be reviewable even if we did not decide that its 
proper issuance is jurisdictional. However, I can locate no rule or 
statute 
that would constitute a grant of appellate jurisdiction to review the 
order 
issuing a certificate of appealability (assuming that it cannot be deemed 
a final order of the district court). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
22, which describes how a petitioner may apply to this court for a 
certificate of appealability, makes no reference to the government's 
contesting a certificate once granted. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently indicated that it 
had "discretion to decide the case by reviewing the validity of the CA or 
by going straight to the issues raised on appeal." United States v. 
Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2000). But see Lucidore v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(finding the state's objection to the certificate of appealability 
foreclosed 
by Soto, 185 F.3d at 52). However, the Court in Marcello cites no 
authority for such review power. 
 
                                27 
  
Although the majority relies upon Hohn to reach its 
conclusion, I see nothing in Hohn, or for that matter, 
Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999), or Slack v. 
McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000), that 
undermines my conclusion. In Hohn, the Supreme Court 
simply concluded that the application for, and denial of, a 
certificate of appealability constituted a "case in the court 
of appeals" such that the Supreme Court had statutory 
jurisdiction to review the denial under S 1254(1). See Hohn, 
524 U.S. at 241, 251 (overruling House v. Mayo , 324 U.S. 
42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), which found that the 
application for, and subsequent denial of, a certificate of 
probable cause was not a "case in the court of appeals"). 
The Court's holding that the denial of a certificate of 
appealability may be reviewed because a "case" exists in the 
court of appeals for purposes of S 1254(1) tells us nothing 
about the role of a certificate of appealability; the Supreme 
Court has statutory jurisdiction to review all types of cases 
of which questions of jurisdiction make up but a small 
part. Furthermore, I fail to grasp the significance the 
majority attributes to the Supreme Court's determination in 
Hohn that decisions regarding the grant or denial of a 
certificate of appealability in the court of appeals are not 
administrative in nature. See ante at 9-11; see also Hohn, 
524 U.S. at 245-46. The majority's analysis both 
presupposes that anything which is not "administrative" is 
jurisdictional, a conclusion that I think is clearly wrong, 
and posits that Hohn disproves the reasoning of those 
courts of appeals that have concluded that an appellate 
court need not examine the grounds for the issuance of a 
certificate of appealability. See Soto, 185 F.3d at 52; Talk, 
158 F.3d at 1068; Young, 124 F.3d at 799; see also Gatlin 
v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1999). I 
disagree. I see the reasoning of those courts, dictated by 
their views of the role of a certificate of appealability, to be 
sound. In Young, Judge Easterbrook focused upon the 
purpose of the certificate of appealability: 
 
       The absence of a certificate of appealability precludes 
       an appeal; should an erroneously issued certificate be 
       treated the same as the lack of a certificate? We think 
       not. The certificate is a screening device, helping to 
       conserve judicial (and prosecutorial) resources. The 
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       obligation to identify a specific issue concentrates the 
       parties' attention (and screens out weak issues); the 
       limitation to constitutional claims also reduces the 
       number of appeals while simultaneously removing a 
       category of claim that under Davis [v. United States, 
       417 U.S. 333 (1974)], and Reed [v. Farley, 512 U.S. 
       339 (1994)] has poor prospects. Once a certificate has 
       issued, however, the case proceeds to briefing and 
       decision; the resources have been invested. It is too 
       late to narrow the issues or screen out weak claims. 
       Perhaps a motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground 
       that a certificate was improperly issued would serve 
       some function. But once the briefs have been written 
       and the case heard, there is little point in scrutinizing 
       the certificate of appealability. An obligation to 
       determine whether a certificate should have been 
       issued, even if the parties do not present this issue for 
       decision -- a step entailed by the conclusion that a 
       proper certificate is a jurisdictional requirement-- 
       would increase the complexity of appeals in collateral 
       attacks and the judicial effort required to resolve them, 
       the opposite of the legislative plan. 
 
Young, 124 F.3d at 799 (emphasis added). 
 
The strongest support for the majority's reliance on Hohn 
comes from the Supreme Court's various characterizations 
of the role of the certificate of appealability as 
"jurisdictional." However, I am unwilling to place 
significance on random statements that have no bearing on 
the actual issue raised in the case, let alone its holding. I 
also note that in Slack, decided after Hohn, the Supreme 
Court characterized the certificate of appealability in a way 
that would suggest it is not jurisdictional in the manner the 
majority concludes. See Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1603 ("The 
[certificate of appealability] statute establishes procedural 
rules and requires a threshold inquiry into whether the 
circuit court may entertain an appeal."). Further, in 
Peguero, the Supreme Court addressed a federal question 
on the merits without reviewing either the propriety of the 
initial grant of a certificate or the Court's own appellate 
jurisdiction to hear the case. While I agree with the majority 
that Peguero does not compel a conclusion as to the 
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meaning of S 2253(c)(2), see ante at 17-19, I, nonetheless, 
think that drawing some meaning from the Court's silence 
in Peguero is no worse than finding meaning regarding the 
issue before us in the Court's opinion in Hohn . 
 
Numerous efforts have been made over the years to 
streamline the process by which the federal courts are to 
sift out those habeas petitions which are unworthy of the 
expenditure of additional judicial resources, and Congress 
considered numerous options before passing AEDPA. See 
Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1578-83 (11th Cir. 
1996) (tracing and discussing the numerous proposed 
reform bills eventually leading to the enactment of AEDPA); 
Judge Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?: Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142 
(1970) (suggesting that district courts should not be 
permitted to grant certificates of probable cause and 
suggesting that the certificate of probable cause 
requirement be extended to petitions from federal custody). 
Given the concerns expressed by Congress regarding the 
efficiency of the process, I cannot help but agree with the 
other circuit courts of appeals that have counseled against 
an interpretation of the statute that would require us to 
engage in a threshold examination of the decision of the 
district court to issue a certificate of appealability. See, e.g., 
Young, 124 F.3d at 799. While it could be argued that a 
threshold review of the issuance of the certificate of 
appealability in cases like this, where the error claimed is 
not constitutional, may promote efficiency, I note that after 
our decision in this case clarifies the meaning of 
S 2253(c)(2), district courts most likely will not grant 
certificates of appealability when a constitutional right is 
not implicated. 
 
While a desire for efficiency should not dictate that we 
shirk our duty to examine our jurisdiction, if such a duty 
is clearly imposed by the statute, knowledge that concerns 
about efficiency were at the heart of Congress's decision to 
modify the certificate requirements should inform our 
interpretation of what the statute does in fact require. I 
would hold the modification of the Barefoot  standard was 
meant to restrict the issuance of a certificate of 
appealability, but that once issued, such issuance should 
lead to merits review. 
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Chief Judge BECKER and Judge SLOVITER join in this 
concurring and dissenting opinion. 
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